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The recent reform of the federal welfare system is meant to encourage recipients
to leave welfare and enter the workforce. If the reform is successful there are likely to
be eects felt throughout the low{skilled end of the labor market. As former welfare
recipients enter the labor market, they may exert downward pressure on wages or
displace employment of others already in the labor market. Since there has been limited
changes in eligibility for federal welfare programs from which to draw inferences, the
magnitude of these labor market eects are open to debate.
This study considers these issues in general and evaluates how labor markets in
Michigan were aected when the General Assistance program in that state was elimi-
nated in 1991. General Assistance was a large{scale, state{administered program that
provided benets to people who fell through the cracks in federal anti{poverty pro-
grams. In all, about eighty to one{hundred thousand able{bodied adults lost benets.
Increased labor force participation among these people resulted in a decline in weekly
hours among high school drop{outs of 1.2 to 2.4 percent. There is little evidence of
declines in hourly earnings, except in the Detroit area, where wages fell by about ve
percent.
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11 Introduction
The 1996 reform of the federal welfare system was aimed at encouraging recipients to
leave welfare and enter the workforce. To accomplish this goal, time{limitations have been
placed on individuals' receipt of benets, and state governments are required to meet federal
targets for moving welfare recipients into the workforce. State governments have also been
given increased ﬂexibility in the design and implementation of programs in order to meet
these goals. If the reform is successful there are likely to be general equilibrium eects felt
throughout the low{skilledend of the labor market: an increase in labor supply among former
recipients would lead to downward pressure on wages or displace employment of others in
the labor market. Because there have not been large changes in eligibility for benets or in
the incentives facing welfare recipients in the past, the magnitude of these eects is open to
debate. Analyses of closely related changes in the labor market and welfare programs are
necessary to better inform the current debate.
This study considers these issues in general and evaluates how labor markets in Michigan
were aected when the General Assistance program in that state was eliminated in October,
1991. Cash benets for able{bodied adults without children were terminated, leaving about
100,000 people { equal to about two percent of the state labor force { to turn to the labor
market, their families, or other private sources for income. To identify the eect of the
increase in labor force participation by former GA recipients, changes in wages, employment,
labor force participation, and hours of work in Michigan are compared with changes in
other states that did not reform their General Assistance program in the two years after
the reform. Eleven control states from the Midwest and northeastern United States are
used: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,
Wisconsin, Missouri, Virginia, and West Virginia.1 Given the geographic proximity and
economic links between Michigan and these states, they provide a credible counterfactual of
how labor markets in Michigan would have evolved in the absence of welfare reform.
A potential problem for future work on the labor market eects of federal welfare reform is
1In 1991 benet levels in Ohio were reduced by about one{third, and most recipients were limited to
receiving benets six months out of a year. In 1992 New York set lower benet levels for new residents in
the state.
1that participants nationwide were aected by the 1996 legislation. Though individual states
are given vastly increased autonomy in the design of welfare programs, inter{state variation
in the fall in welfare caseloads will be the result of dierences in economic conditions, in
state policies, and other aspects of labor markets in each state. It may be dicult, therefore,
to identify the causal role of welfare reform on labor market outcomes.2 A unique feature
of this evaluation is a clear counterfactual group. Much attention will be paid, however, to
controlling for dierences between the labor market in Michigan and in the control states
that are not due to the elimination of the General Assistance program.
Of the one hundred thousand GA recipients at the time the program was eliminated,
some were able to enroll in other government programs, in particular people with disabilities
or with dependent children. Of the eighty{two thousand people who it is estimated lost
all public transfers, if forty to fty thousand people (roughly fty to sixty percent) entered
the labor market, that would represent an increase of 1% to 1.25% in the state labor force.
More relevant, it would represent an increase of 8% to 10% of the ve hundred thousand
people in the state without a high school degree who were in the labor force. Because the
eects of increased labor force participation among former recipients are likely to be felt
most strongly in the low{skilled labor market, this analysis focuses on identifying changes
in economic outcomes among people without a high school degree.
Before the estimation of econometric models, a simple theoretical model is presented that
illustrates some of the important eects that welfare reform in a local economy could have
on the employment and earnings of others in the labor market. This serves to highlight the
relevant elasticities, as well as how the results depend on the distribution of skills throughout
the locality. With earnings data from Michigan in 1990, the model is calibrated and the
change in earnings and hours of workers without a high school degree are simulated. It is
argued that for reasonable parameter choices, earnings are likely to decline by no more than
two to four percent, and hourly of work by no more than one percent. The actual eects
may be even smaller, however, based on alternative parameter choices.
The data used in this study come from the 1989 through 1993 monthly Current Population
2In addition, it may be some time before adequate data exists to fully assess how federal welfare reform
aected local labor markets.
2Survey. The basic econometric specication is a quasi{experimental, treatment{ and control{
group model in which the change in individual measures of employment, hours, earnings,
and labor force participation for people in Michigan before and after the elimination of the
GA program are compared to the change in outcomes for people in the control states over
the same time period. The model also accounts for demographic characteristics, such as age,
education, and race, that are correlated with economic outcomes.
If there were dierences other than the elimination of the GA program that aected labor
markets in Michigan and the control states, this estimate alone does not identify the eect
of the elimination of GA benets. Therefore, an important additional feature of the identi-
cation method is that dierences in economic outcomes between Michigan and the control
states are estimated conditional on dierences between the states in business cycle eects
and other unobservable labor demand shocks. Dierences in labor demand are accounted
for by allowing demand shocks to dierentially eect the labor market outcomes of people
of dierent ages, genders, and levels of education. These added controls are particularly
important since the unemployment rate in Michigan fell considerably faster than that in the
control states following the recession in the early 1990's. This likely is a signal of dierent
economic conditions in Michigan, other than the reform of the state welfare system there,
and consequently a comparison of economic outcomes that ignores these dierences will lead
to a biased estimate of the eect of the elimination of the GA program.
The results show that employment among people without a high school degree { those
who are most likely to be aected by increased labor market participation among former
welfare recipients { increased by one to two and a half percentage points, relative to the
change in employment of people with a high school degree. Average hours of work among
workers fell by 1.2 to 2.4 percent. There is little evidence of declines in hourly earnings,
except in the Detroit area, where wages fell by about ve percent.
2 The General Assistance Program in Michigan
General Assistance refers to state, county, or local welfare programs designed to pro-
vide cash payments to poor individuals who do not qualify for federal programs, such as
3Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
or Unemployment Insurance (UI). AFDC provides cash benets primarily to poor, unmar-
ried woman with children. The AFDC{Unemployed Parent program extends benets to
two{parent families where one parent has a documented work history though is currently
unemployed. Similarly, to qualify for Unemployment Insurance benets, unemployed work-
ers must meet minimum employment and earnings requirements. Unemployment benets
can generally only be drawn for twenty{six weeks. SSI provides benets to low{income
people over the age of sixty{ve or who are disabled. Thus GA programs generally serve
non{elderly single adults, childless couples, and families who do not qualify for AFDC or the
Unemployed Parent program; people who do not meet the work history requirement for UI
benets or exhaust their UI benets; and disabled people who await or do not qualify for
SSI benets. In Michigan, changes in the GA caseload closely followed the business cycle,
which suggests that a portion of the caseload was able to participate in the labor market.
According to a 1992 survey, twenty{one states and the District of Columbia have a
General Assistance program with uniform state{wide rules.3 Ten additional states do not
operate a GA program, but require each county or locally to do so. The remaining nineteen
states do not have any state{wide program or requirements, though individual counties may
operate a program.
Prior to the reforms in 1991, Michigan's GA program was run through the state's Depart-
ment of Social Services. The monthly benet was calculated in a manner similar to AFDC
benets: eligibility was limited to people with income and assets below certain thresholds,
which varied by county and household size. Like AFDC benets, additional labor earnings
were taxed by the system, with a dollar{for{dollar reduction in GA benets for each increase
in earnings.
Possibly because General Assistance programs vary substantially across and within states,
it has not received nearly as much scholarly attention as the major federal anti{poverty
programs. However, the program in Michigan served nearly half as many families as did
AFDC: the average monthly GA caseload in 1990 was 97,860, with an average of 1.29 people
per case; while the AFDC average monthly caseload in Michigan was 217,949, with an
3See Nichols, Dunlap and Barkan (1992).
4average of three people per case. In terms of cash payments, the average monthly GA grant
per case in 1990 was $237.55, or about $6.14 per person per day. By comparison, the average
AFDC family received $464.05 per month, or $5.16 per person per day.4 General Assistance
participants also receive medical benets and, in most cases, food stamps.
As a response to scal pressures in the early 1990's, many state governments began to
cut spending on social welfare programs in general, and General Assistance in particular.5
The elimination of the GA program in Michigan was the most dramatic of all the early
welfare reforms in terms of the number of people aected and the amount of lost benets.
Able{bodied adults without children lost all benets. Families with dependent children were
allowed to receive benets under the new State Family Assistance program. Approximately
9,700 families were thought to be eligible for this program, though actual participation was
about half that.6 Adults who had been disabled for at least ninety days and had not qualied
for SSI were placed in the new State Disability Assistance program. The average monthly
caseload in 1992 was 8,253. For most people SDA benets were given as interim assistance
until SSI benets were approved. In sum, then, about 82,000 people { or eighty{four percent
of the original caseload { lost all benets in Michigan as a result of the October, 1991 reforms.
The top panel of Table (1) presents sample means from the March CPS for people aged
sixteen to fty{four who received income in the previous year from non{AFDC public as-
sistance.7 The table is divided into four time periods, 1979 to 1988, 1989 to 1991 (the
pre{reform period used in this study), 1992 to 1993 (the post{reform period), and 1994 to
1996; as well as by those who lived in Michigan and in the control states. The rst statistic
is the sample size for each column. Importantly, and expectedly, the number of Michigan
residents in the data who report income from non{AFDC public assistance drops consider-
ably in the last two time periods. The second line uses the March CPS sample weights to
4Figures are from Department of Social Services, State of Michigan (1990). The AFDC gures refers to
both Family Groups and Unemployed Parent participants.
5For a summary of such policy changes at the state level see Shapiro, Sheft, Strawn, Summer, Greenstein
and Gold (1991) and Lav, Lazere, Greenstein and Gold (1993).
6Federal waivers were granted to Michigan in 1992 that allowed the state to change its AFDC eligibility
criterion. This allowed many participants of the SFA program to enroll in AFDC.
7This assistance could, however, come from sources other than GA. The term \Public assistance" is used
to refer to any non{AFDC program, while \General assistance" is reserved for that specic program. Note,
some people report income from both non{AFDC public assistance and from the AFDC program. Such
people are included in Table (1).
5estimate how many people this sample represents per year. The 81,269 estimated average
public assistance population in Michigan in 1989 through 1991 is about twenty percent below
what administrative records indicate the population to have been.8 In the two years after
the reform the number drops to 36,454 people. These remaining recipients may have been
placed on the medical assistance program that began in 1991, or were originally on a public
assistance program other than General Assistance.
The composition of the Michigan public assistance group changed relative to those in
the control states in ways that conform to what would be expected from the elimination of
benets for able{bodied adults: The residual programs maintained or created were meant to
serve the disabled and those with dependent children. The most telling statistics in Table
(1) to this eect are that the proportion of public assistance recipients with a college degree
in Michigan jumped from 19.5% in 1989{1991 to 37.1% in 1992{1993. This doubling was far
greater than the increase in the control states, from 15.4% to 19.1%. As well, from 1989 to
1993 there was a large change in the labor force status of those on public assistance. Before
the General Assistance program was eliminated, about half of public assistance recipients
in Michigan were in the labor force and about one half of recipients in the labor force were
unemployed. After the GA program was eliminated, however, the remainingpublic assistance
recipients in Michigan were far more likely to be out of the labor force (65.6% in 1992{1993)
and very few of those in the labor force were looking for work: their unemployment rate was
12.2% percent after 1992.
The bottom panel of Table (1) gives the percent of all people sampled who report income
from AFDC and from non{AFDC public assistance. Public assistance recipiency drops from
1.6% to 0.7% in Michigan, while it rises from 1.0% to 1.1% in other states.
Table (2) compares the characteristics of public assistance recipients to the overall pop-
ulation in each state.9 In both Michigan and the control states, public assistance programs
8According to the State of Michigan Assistance Payment Statistics, in September, 1991, there were 99,930
open General Assistance cases in the state. It is likely that the Current Population Survey undercounts those
most likely to have been on GA, but is able to accurately count those who remain on public aid after the
benets are terminated for able{bodied adults. The sampling error for these population estimates is also
quite large. Blank (1997) nds that the CPS counts only about seventy{ve percent of AFDC cases, which
is consistent with the undercount found here.
9Due to the small sample size for the Michigan public assistance group, the means presented here are
estimated with a considerably larger variance than the public assistance group in the control states.
6generally serve non{married and poorly educated individuals, as expected. Interestingly, the
proportion of public assistance recipients who live in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
in Michigan is the same as the population as a whole, approximately eighty{two percent.
3 Literature Review
Previous work oers only limited guidance on the magnitude of wage and employment
changes that would result from the increased labor supply of former welfare recipients. The
few studies of the labor market eects of federal welfare reform take supply and demand
elasticities from previous work outside the area of welfare and welfare reform and use this
to construct estimates of employment displacement and wage changes derived from a simple
supply and demand framework.10 The dicultyin drawing credibleinferences from this work
is that labor supply and demand elasticities for very low skilled workers (and unmarried
mothers in the case of federal welfare reform) may not be the same as those estimated
for workers in general. For example, although most studies tend to nd that labor supply
among all workers is not very responsive to wages, Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991) provide
evidence that this may not be true among very low{skilled workers. A recent survey of
several methodologies by Bartik (1998) examines how labor markets have been aected by
federal welfare reform measures between 1996 and 1998, and concludes that declines in wages
among female heads of household are likely to be small.
Closely related to the labor market eects of welfare reform is how labor markets re-
spond to the inﬂux of new, largely unskilled, immigrants. Card (1997), to cite one example
from this literature, argues that immigration in the 1980's to American metropolitan areas
had minimal eects on the earnings of native{born workers. Though small employment dis-
placement eects are found, the results suggest that labor demand may be quite inelastic.11
Also related to the elasticity of labor demand is the employment eect of increases in the
minimum wage. Recent work by Card and Krueger (1995) argues that there was little em-
ployment displacement following recent increases in the federal and state minimum wages,
10See for example Mishel and Schmitt (1995) and Bernstein (1997).
11Other studies of the eect of immigration the labor market are Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992) and
Card (1990).
7which suggests that labor demand may be elastic.
4 A Simple Model of Welfare Reform
This section presents a simple model that illustrates some of the important eects that
could be expected from the elimination of a welfare program in a local economy.12 Welfare
recipients tend to be among the lowest skilled in the population. To draw out the conse-
quences of this fact, a key feature of the model is the allowance for a heterogeneity of skills
across the population. This heterogeneity leads to a dierential impact of welfare reform on
people of dierent skills throughout the local labor market.
Consider a local labor market in which there are N people working and a group of size
dN people on welfare. Welfare recipients are assumed not to work. There are two prices for
labor in the economy, ws for skilled labor and wu for unskilled labor. Individuals vary in the
amount of skill they have; each person is assumed to have one unit of unskilled labor and
i units of skilled labor. Thus an individual's wage is given by wi = wu + iws.W e l f a r e
recipients earn a benet of Bi.
The demand side of the market is specied as simply as possible, while allowing changes
in income that result from welfare reform to aect product demand. There are two goods in
the economy: a locally produced good, which is sold locally and exported, and a numeraire
national good. Export demand for the local good is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. Firms
in the local economy operate with identical constant returns to scale production technology,
summarized by the unit cost function c(wu;w s;r). Capital is assumed to be perfectly ﬂexible
and readily available at the interest rate r. The local sector is perfectly competitive, and
thus the price of the local good is equal to marginal cost.
Firms in the industry demand skilled and unskilled labor, and hire people with combina-
tions of these qualities. Demand for unskilled labor units is given by Du = y  c1(wu;w s;r),
and for skilled labor units is given by Ds = y  c2(wu;w s;r).13 Individuals supply Li(wi;p)
units of unskilled labor, and iLi(wi;p) units of skilled labor. Labor market equilibrium is
12See Appendix (A) for the details and solution of the model. Studies by Altonji and Card (1991) and
Johnson (1998) examine similar models in the context of the eects of immigration.
13ci(wu;w s;r) represents the derivative of the unit cost function, c(), with respect to its ith argument.
8given by the equality of the supply and demand for each type of labor. By Walras' law the




be the ratio of the unskilled labor supplied by person l to the pre{reform
stock of unskilled labor. Similarly, let l =
lLl PN
i=1 iLi
be the ratio of the skilled labor supplied
by person l to the pre{reform stock of skilled labor. Thus, the sum of l and l taken over the
former welfare recipients (denoted by j = N +1t oN + dN) gives the increase in unskilled
and skilled labor added to the local economy as a result of these former recipients entering
the labor market. Also, denote by l =
xl PN+dN
k=1 xk
the share of total output bought by person
l. The elasticity of the demand for locally produced output with respect to income is γw.
The elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage rate is w; and with respect to the
price of locally produced output is p. Finally, let n be the share of total costs paid by the
rms to labor type n.
A base case for evaluating the eect of welfare reform ignores labor supply eects (p =
w = 0), any demand eects on the local product market (γw = 0), and assumes welfare
recipientsdo not contribute to the pool of skilledlabor (
PN+dN
j=N+1 j = 0). In this case the level
of output and employment is exogenous in equations (16) and (17), and the proportionate
change in wages depends only on the uncompensated elasticities of labor demand and the



















where nm is the uncompensated elasticity of demand for labor of type n with respect to the
wage of type m. If there are no cross{price eects (su = us = 0), then the skilled wage rate
is unchanged by the addition of unskilled workers to the labor force, and unskilled wages
change by the inverse of the elasticity of demand for unskilled labor. Otherwise, nonzero
cross{price elasticities introduce feedback between the market for skilled and unskilled labor.
Unskilled wage rates will decrease with the addition of unskilled labor to the economy, while
skilled wages can increase or decrease, depending on the sign of su.14
14Unskilled wages will unambiguously decrease as long as uuss − suus is positive, which is likely as
long as demand for each type of labor is most sensitive to its own wage.
9If there are product demand and labor supply eects, and the welfare population con-












































where the summations over j are over the former welfare recipients, j = N +1t oN + dN.
The terms in parentheses, therefore, are the proportionate increase in skilled (
P
j j)a n d
unskilled (
P
j j) labor supplied by former welfare recipients, less their change in product
demand brought about by their change in income. The four terms labeled mn translate this
net impact by the former welfare recipientsinto changes in skilled and unskilled wages. These
depend on the uncompensated elasticity of labor demand and supply, and the elasticity of
the demand for output.
The consideration of local product demand eects leads to two complications: rst, as
welfare recipients' benets are replaced by wages, their (positive or negative) change in
income aects their demand for output, and this feeds through to rms' demand for labor.
If a substantial number of welfare recipients nd jobs and thus increase their income and
product demand, the increase in labor demand that results will partially oset the downward
wage pressure brought about by the initial increase in labor force participation. Alternatively,
if welfare recipients' income falls (either because they fail to nd a job or their wages are
lower than their previous benets) the resulting decrease in product demand will exacerbate
the downward pressure on wages. A second product market eect arises because the change
in earnings of workers already in the labor market prior to the reform aects their product
demand. This feeds back into rms' demand for labor and equilibrium wages.
The change in employment among people already in the labor market prior to the welfare
reform is obtained by dierentiating the individual labor supply function, Li(wi;p), and
substituting in the changes in wages and prices. The change in labor supplied to the low{
















10Elastic labor supply with respect to wages implies that people will work less when their wage
falls. When wages fall, however, the price of locally produced output also falls. This could
be thought of as a rise people's income and, if p is positive, also lead people to work fewer
hours.
To get an idea of the magnitude of the wage and employment changes that welfare reform
in Michigan is likely to produce, equations (3), (4), and (5) are simulated using data on
Michigan residents in the 1990 Current Population Survey. Hourly earnings are constructed
as the ratio of reported weekly earnings to reported hours worked in the week prior to the
interview.15 The sample contains all civilians aged sixteen to fty{four with nonmissing
hourly wage data. Observations with hourly earnings less than $2 or greater than $100 per
hour (all values are in 1995 dollars) are dropped, leaving a sample of 6562 observations. The
average wage among all people is $15.45, and among people without a high school degree
is $10.57, eighty{two percent higher than the minimum wage of $4.96. The twenty{fth,
median, and seventy{fth percentiles are $8.21, $12.87, and $19.92.
For the simulations, the unskilled wage rate is set at the tenth percentile of the wage
distribution in Michigan, $5.80. The skilled wage rate is set at the ninetieth percentile of the
wage distribution, $27.70. Individual's level of skill is then given by i = (Hourly wage −
$5:80)=$27:70.16 Welfare recipients' benet is set at the average monthly grant per person in
Michigan prior to the elimination of the program, $180 per month. Recipients are assumed
to earn $450 per month (which is what someone makes who earns $5.80 per hour and works
20 hours per week for four and a half weeks), if they work, when benets are eliminated. All
former welfare recipients are assumed to be unskilled (i =0 ) .
Other parameters of the simulation are set as follows: the share of total costs paid to all
labor is assumed to 70%. The share of total costs paid to unskilled labor (u) is 44% and
the share paid to skilled labor (s) is 26%. The elasticity of demand for locally produced
output with respect to its price is -0.5, and is 0.5 with respect to earnings. The elasticity of
labor supply with respect to product prices is assumed to be zero. The elasticity of labor
15Questions about usual earnings are only asked in the fourth and eighth monthly interviews; these are
the so{called Outgoing Rotation Groups. See section (5) for details.
16Workers who earn less than $5.80 an hour are assigned a skill level of i =0 .
11supply with respect to earnings is simulated at zero and 0.4. The own{partial elasticity of
substitution for each type of labor (ll and ss, see appendix) is simulated at -15, -5 , and -1;
and the partial elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor (su and us)i s
simulated at -0.75, -0.25, 0, 0.25, and 0.75. The size of the GA caseload is assumed to be
2% of the state population, though only half of these are assumed to work after benets are
eliminated. Thus potential earnings by former welfare recipients are discounted by half.17
For a given set of parameter values, changes in the skilled and unskilled wages are sim-
ulated. Then, using the distribution of the skill parameter from the sample of people from
Michigan, changes in hourly earnings and weekly hours among high school drop{outs in
Michigan are presented in Table (3). The top panel presents results where the elasticity
of labor supply with respect to earnings is 0.4. The columns represent alternative choices
of the partial elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor, ranging from
-0.75 to 0.75. Below these, in parenthesis, are the corresponding values of the elasticity of
the demand for skilled labor with respect to the price of unskilled labor. The rows repre-
sent alternative choices for the own partial elasticity of substitution, with the corresponding
elasticity of demand for unskilled labor given in parentheses.18
The most important thing to note from the results is that the simulated changes in hourly
earnings and weekly hours of work are very small: for uu equal to -15, which corresponds to
an elasticity of demand for low{skilled labor of -4.01, hourly wages of people without a high
school degree fall by only one tenth of one percent. For uu equal to -5, wages still only fall
by about one quarter of one percent, with little variation among alternative choices of the
elasticity of substitution of skilled and unskilled labor. In both of these cases the changes in
hours worked per week are also close to zero.
Signicant decreases in the hourly wages only come about when labor demand is very
inelastic, as seen in the third row of the table. When skilled and unskilled labor are relative
17To simplify the simulation, the share the output purchased by an individual, l, is assumed to be equal
to his share of the total labor income, wl PN+dN
k=1 wk
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es to  wu
 w  N
N+dN ,t h e
ratio of the unskilled wage to the average wage, times fraction of the population working prior to the welfare






 w  dN
N+dN .
18The elasticities of demand depend on other parameters in the model and are given here only for ease in
interpretation.
12substitutes (us equal to -0.75, in the rst column), hourly earnings among people without
a high school degree would fall by 2.27 percent and hours worked per week falls by 0.91
percent. The decrease in wages and hours worked is smaller the larger is the elasticity of
substitution.
The second panel presents results where the elasticity of labor supply is set to zero. As
in the top panel, the decrease in wages is very close to zero for uu equal to -15 and -5. For
the case of very inelastic labor demand, wages fall by about twice as much as in the case
of slightly elastic labor supply (though in the case where us equals 0.75, wages actually
increase).19
Thus, signicant decreases in hourly earnings would only be expected if the demand for
labor is quite inelastic and skilled and unskilled labor are good substitutes. The intuition
behind this result is, at least in these simulations, former welfare recipients supply only
unskilled labor, while the average person with a high school degree derives about thirty
percent of his income by supplying skilled labor. This supply of skilled labor, the price of
which is largely unaected by welfare reform, acts to buer the decline in earnings among
typical workers in this group.
5D a t a
The data used to evaluate changes in economic outcomes in Michigan are from the
monthly Current Population Survey. Each household in the CPS sample is interviewed for
four months, then ignored for eight months, and then interviewed for the next four months
(corresponding to the same four months of year they were interviewed the previous year).
In each interview respondents are asked about their current labor force status; however,
only in their fourth and eighth interview are they asked about their usual weekly earnings.
Respondents are asked about annual income and its sources, including welfare and general
assistance participation, only in the March Supplement to the CPS.
Because the eects on the Michigan labor market from the elimination of General Assis-
19In simulations (not reported) where the elasticity of demand for output is zero with respect to both its
price and personal earnings, the fall in wages is slightly larger than those reported here, but the general
pattern of the results is unchanged.
13tance are likely to aect a small portion of the population, there is a premium to having a
large sample in order to obtain as precise estimates as possible. Thus unlike most studies that
use the Current Population Survey, this work uses all eight interviews in which respondents
participate.20
All civilians aged sixteen to fty{four, who are not self{employed, are used in the estima-
tion. Observations with hourly earnings below $2 per hour (1995$), or with weekly earnings
data but missing hours, are also dropped from the sample. Table (4) presents sample statis-
tics for the variables used in the analysis, broken down by whether the person resided in
Michigan and whether they were interviewed prior to October, 1991. The top panel of the
table indicates there are few dierences in the covariates between people in Michigan and
those in the control states.21 The proportion of nonwhites is slightly higher in Michigan;
the proportion of the population with a college degree or more education is slightly lower.
Although the inﬂuence of these covariates are controlled for in the model, had they diered
substantially between Michigan and the control states it may signal that the latter is not
a good indicator for how the economy of Michigan would have evolved in the absence of
welfare reform.
The bottom panel of Table (4) gives the means of the various dependent variables. A
person is employed if they worked for a wage any time during the previous week. Labor
force participation is dened as some either working or looking for work (unemployed). Two
measures of hours of work are examined: hours worked last week among workers and among
all people. The former is a measure of the extent of part{time versus full{time work; the
latter is a measure of total work eort, whichincludes transitions into and out of employment.
Finally, respondents are asked about their weekly earnings. From this, hourly earnings is
calculated as the ratio of weekly earnings to the number of hours worked last week. Both
wage measures are deﬂated to 1995 dollars. In the empirical work below, the log, rather
than the level, of weekly and hourly earnings used.
In Michigan the employment{to{population ratio increases after the reform by one per-
20Since questions about earnings are only asked in two of the eight interviews, estimates of changes in
earnings are based on a smaller sample.
21The dierence in educational attainment between the two time periods are due to changes in the CPS
questionnaire in 1992.
14centage point, from 71.1% to 72.1%. In the control states employment fell by 1.2 percentage
points, from 73.3% to 72.1% of the population, after October, 1991. If in the absence of wel-
fare reform in Michigan the employment rate would have dropped by 1.2 percentage points
as well, a simple estimate of the eect of the reform on employment is that it led to a 2.2 (=
1.0 - (-1.2)) percentage point point increase in employment in Michigan. Similar calculations
indicate that the unemployment rate was 1.3 percentage points higher, and weekly earnings
were $3.96 higher in Michigan than they otherwise would have been. These estimates are
not, however, credible estimates of the eect of the elimination of the GA program, since
there were likely other dierences between the labor market in Michigan and in the control
states. In particular, there may have been changes in the demand for labor.
Figures (1) and (2) plot the unemployment rate in Michigan and in the control states
from 1980 to 1998.22 The rst graph is the rate among all people aged sixteen to fty{
four, while the second is the rate among those without a high school degree. The vertical
lines in each graph indicate the pre{ and post{reform periods used in this study. The
unemployment rate followed similar trends in Michigan and in the control states, though
with a level dierence between the two. Beginning in 1991, with recovery from the recession,
this level dierence disappears as unemployment falls faster in Michigan than in the control
states. This pattern holds among high school drop{outs as well. Changes in the economy of
Michigan other than the elimination of GA benets were taking place. A simple comparison
of changes in employment and unemployment does not identify the eect of welfare reform.
The identication procedure in section (6) controls for these dierences in labor demand
across states, and across skill groups within states.
6 Econometric Specication
The eect of the elimination of General Assistance on labor markets in Michigan is
identied by comparing the changes in wages, employment, unemployment, labor force par-
ticipation, and hours of work in Michigan with changes in eleven comparison states that
did not reform their General Assistance program in the two years after Michigan's reform.
22These data are from the March CPS and reﬂect individuals' labor force status in that month.
15Since economic conditions are likely to have diered in Michigan and the control states, an
important feature of the identication method is that the eects are estimated conditional
on the demand for labor of people of dierent observable skill groups, based on their age,
education, and gender. These characteristics are meant to group together people who are
likely to be aected similarly by economic shocks. The age groups are sixteen to twenty{
nine, thirty to thirty{nine, and forty or older. The education groups are those without a
high school degree, those with high school degree only, and those with any post{high school
education. With gender, these form eighteen distinct groups.
The outcome of person i,i ng r o u pj, state s,a tt i m et, is modeled as
wijst = xijst + djst + ijst (6)
where xijst is a set of covariates that are correlated with economic outcomes; djst is the
average outcome of people in group j, state s,a tt i m et;a n dijst is an unobservable term
that reﬂects individual attributes that inﬂuence economic outcomes. Since the skill groups
already break the sample into education, age, and gender cells, the covariates (xijst) include
a spline in age and its square within each of the three age ranges, as well as indicators for
people who have a college degree and those with any post{graduate education. Also included
are indicators for people who are married, nonwhite, both married and nonwhite, and for
those who live in a central{city area.23 An ordinary least squares regression of equation (6)
produces estimated average outcomes, ^ djst, among people in each skill group{state{time cell,
conditional on the individual covariates.
The eect of increased labor market participation by former General Assistance recipients
is measured by changes in the average outcomes of groups in Michigan after October, 1991.
Thus ^ djst is modeled as
^ djst = cj + js + jt + jst + γjsUst + yt + jst (7)
where cj is a group eect, js is a state and skill group eect, jt is a time and skill group





Nonwhite)11 +( C i t y ) 12,w h e r eage1 is equal to the dierence between the individual's age and the mean
age among people less than thirty, if the individual is less than thirty, and zero otherwise. Similarly for age2
and age3 for those in the other two age groups.
16eect, and jst is the treatment eect. Ust is the unemployment rate among men in state s
at time t, which captures business cycle inﬂuences on group outcomes. People in dierent
skill groups and states vary in their responsiveness to changes in the overall unemployment
rate, which is captured by the loading factor γjs. Finally, yt is a time xed eect, which
reﬂects trends in outcomes among all people, as well as sample design dierences in the CPS
from year to year. jst is an error term that represents unobservable inﬂuences on average
economic outcomes, as well as sampling error in the estimation of the cell means.
The treatment eect in equation (7) is implemented as an indicator for people who lived
in Michigan after October, 1991, when the General Assistance program was eliminated. Since
js captures permanent dierences in the level of outcomes between each group in Michigan
and the corresponding group in the control states, and jt captures changes in outcomes
of each group across both Michigan and the control states, the treatment eect measures
how much average outcomes for groups in Michigan diered after the elimination of the GA
program from what they would have been had their change been the same as those groups
in the comparison states, controlling for dierences in labor market eects, γjsUst.T h i s
method is implemented in specications (1) and (3) in Tables (5) and (6), discussed in more
detail below.
If there are no other eects specic to the labor market in Michigan after October,
1991, other than those captured by γjsUst, then the OLS estimate of jst in equation (7) is
an unbiased estimate of the eect of the elimination of the GA program on labor market
outcomes. Put dierently, the unobserved inﬂuences on economic outcomes, captured by the
error term, jst, must be uncorrelated with jst.24 Particularly because the unemployment
rate in the state may not capture all dierences in labor market conditions between Michigan
and the control state, this assumption may be overly restrictive. Three less restrictive
assumptions about the error term give rise to alternative, unbiased estimates of the treatment
eect.
One generalization is to model the unobservable term as having a component that aects
24In addition, it is assumed the state policy to eliminate the GA program was not itself related to changes
in labor market outcomes in Michigan, and that savings in the state budget were not put back in the economy
in a way that would eect labor markets.
17all groups in a state at a particular time, as well as a random component unique to each
group{state{time cell. Specically,
jst = st + jst (8)
Unlike the labor market eects captured by the unemployment rate, the state{ and time{
specic shocks captured by st aect all groups in the state equally. If it is assumed that the
elimination of the GA program in Michigan did not aect the average labor market outcomes
of workers with a high school degree or more education, then the treatment eect on workers
without a high school degree can be estimated as the dierence in average outcomes among
the lowest educated group and those with more education, relative to this dierence among
people in the control states. Because of the large number of better educated people in the
Michigan, and the fact that former GA recipients would have likely taken very low{skilled
jobs, it is reasonable to assume that only the average outcomes of people without a high
school degree would be aected by GA reform. The dierence in outcomes among better
educated people in Michigan and the comparison states is thus a measure of st.
To implement this dierence estimator, dene ej to be an indicator that group j is
composed of people without a high school degree. Interactions between ej and js, jt,a n d
jst are included in equation (7):










jst capture the dierential eects among people without a high school
degree. The treatment eect is now the term ejjst, which measures the change in labor
market outcomes among the least educated groups relative to the change among better
educated people, in Michigan relative to the control states. In the empirical implementation,
given in specications (2) and (4) in Tables (5) and (6), groups composed of people with
some college education are dropped from the model and the treatment eect is estimated
as the dierence in outcomes between high school drop{outs and people with only a high
school degree.25
25People with some post{high school education are dropped since their labor market may be quite distinct
from that of lower educated people.
18An alternative to the assumption that the unobservable shock st in equation (8) aects
all groups in the state equally is to assume groups are aected by observable business cycle
shocks and unobservable shocks to the same degree. That is, if jst = γjsst + jst,t h e n
equation (7) can be rearranged to give
^ djst = js + jt + jst + γjs(Ust + st)+yt + jst
= js + jt + jst + γjs(~ st)+yt + jst (10)
Here the combined shock to each group at time t in state s is given by the product γjs(~ st).
Since the equation is nonlinear in the parameters, nonlinear least squares must be used. This
method is implemented in specications (1) and (3) in Table (7).
Finally, the two previous cases can be combined to allow for a common unobserved shock
to all groups in each state at a particular time, as well as a shock that aects each group by
the factor γjs. That is, the unobservables are modeled as
jst = γjsst + st + jst (11)
The treatment eect is estimated by comparing the change in outcomes of the least edu-
cated group relative to those with a high school degree, as in equation (9). When jst is
substituted into equation (9), the model becomes nonlinear in the parameters. Results of
this specication are given in specications (2) and (4) in Table (7).
An important assumption of this construction is that the relative demand for people
of dierent skill groups within a state is constant over time (γjs does not vary over time).
This assumption may seem problematic given the well{known decrease in demand for less{
skilled labor over the past two decades. If these do not aect Michigan dierently than the
comparison states, the term jt and the time xed eects will control for the eect of these
changes on the outcome variables. Further, since the estimates below are derived from a
ve{year time period, any long term{trends specic to Michigan should have only a modest
eect on the results.
A number of simplications are made to the model in equation (7). Rather than represent
all eighteen skill groups, the terms cj, js, jt,a n djst dier only by the three education
19classes (less than a high school degree, only a high school degree, or some collegeeducation).26
In some specications the treatment eect, however, will dier by education and gender. In
addition, people who live in the control states are treated as if they live in one state, rather
than separately identifying each individual state. Finally, the observations are grouped
quarterly, rather than monthly, to guard against small cell sizes. With two states, eighteen
skill groups, and twenty quarters of data, there are seven hundred twenty cell means (^ djst).
Finally, use of the quarterly unemployment rate of all men as a proxy for local labor
demand raises the issue of the so{called reﬂection problem. The overall unemployment rate
in the state reﬂects all changes in the local labor market, and in particular any eect from the
elimination of the GA program in Michigan. The inclusion of it in the model, therefore, may
absorb some of the true variation in labor market outcomes caused by welfare reform. An
alternative measure of the local demand for labor is the unemployment rate among college
educated men, rather than the overall male unemployment rate. The labor market for higher
educated and better skilled individuals would have been aected to a much smaller degree by
increased labor market participation among very low{skilled individuals. While this measure
is arguably unaected by welfare reform, it may, however, track changes in the demand for
low{skilled labor rather poorly. In addition, because of the smaller number of college{
educated men in the data, the unemployment rates are measured with less precision. The
results in Table (5) present results of models that use the overall unemployment rate among
men, while the models in Table (6) use the unemployment rate among college educated men.
6.1 Estimating standard errors
Ecient estimation of equation (7) requires the use of the full variance{covariance matrix
of the skill group{state{time cell means as a weighting matrix. While this matrix can be
estimated directly from the residuals of equation (6), because of the unique design features
of the Current Population Survey, this is not appropriate in this case. Each individual is
observed in the data up to eight times. Particularly because the individual observations are
monthly, there is likely to be serial correlation in the unobservable component in equation
26That is, js, for example, is implemented as a dummy variable for each combination of the three
education groups and whether the person resided in Michigan or the control states.
20(6), ijst. Furthermore, the CPS is a household{level survey. Households are randomly
selected, and all members of the household participate in the survey. Thus, to the extent
that individuals within the household jointly determine their employment and hours of work,
the unobservable component will be correlated among members of the same household.27
The bootstrap method is used to obtain an unbiased estimate of the variance matrix of
the cell means. To mimic the randomization in the CPS sample design, households are drawn
with replacement from the set of all households appearing in the data at any time. For each
household chosen, all observations associated with that household at any time are included in
the dataset. This randomization procedure is replicated fty times, producing fty dierent
\random samples" of data, upon which equation (6) is estimated. The empirical covariance
matrix of the fty sets of cell means is an unbiased estimate of the true variance matrix.
However, unless the number of bootstrap replications is at least as large as the number of
observations (the seven hundred twenty cell means), this estimated variance matrix is not
invertible and therefore cannot be used as a weight matrix in a generalized least squares
procedure.28 29
A alternative estimation procedure is to use the relative sample size in the each state{
quarter{group cell as a weight in a weighted least squares, or nonlinear least squares, esti-
mate of equation (7). The standard errors are then computed in a second step using the
bootstrapped covariance matrix. The following makes this procedure precise for the lin-
ear regression case: let Z be the (N  K) matrix of explanatory variables in equation (7)
and denote as ^ D the (N  1) column vector of the economic outcome under consideration.
Equation (7) can then be represented as
^ D = Z+ (12)
27Assortive mating that is correlated with unobserved skills will have a similar eect on the correlation of
unobservable determinants of wages.
28To see this, let c(r) be a column vector of the deviation of the coecients from the rth bootstrap
replication from the mean of the fty coecients. If there are R bootstrap replications, the bootstrap
estimate of the variance{covariance matrix is given by V =( 1 =R)
P
r c(r)  c(r)0. The rank of c(r)i so n e ,
and thus the rank of c(r)  c(r)0 is one. Since V is is the sum of R matricies each with a rank of one, the
rank of V is at most R, and thus not invertible if there less bootstrap replications than the number of cell
means.
29Even if the estimated variance matrix was invertible, any sampling error in the variance of the cell means
is correlated with sampling error in the estimated variance matrix. Altonji and Segal (1996) show that this
leads to a small sample bias when the inverse of the variance matrix is used as a weight in a GMM procedure.
21where  is the parameter vector and  is vector of error terms. G is the weight matrix, an (N
 N) diagonal matrix where the nth diagonal element is the ratio of the number of people in
nth skill group{state{quarter cell to the total number of people in the sample. The weighted




0G ^ D (13)
If there is no specication error in equation (7), and the only source of error derives from
sampling error in the estimation of the cell means, then the variance{covariance matrix of
those estimates can be used to compute the standard errors of the second stage parameter
estimates. Let  be the bootstrap estimate of the true variance{covariance matrix of D,







Note this is not equal to the variance matrix computed with the weighted least squares
formula since  does not equal G−1.30 For the nonlinear least squares models, the matrix Z
in equation (14) is replaced by the matrix of derivatives of the regression equation (10).
7 Regression Results
Tables (5) through (8) present estimation results on the cell means. The rst specication
in each table presents results for the estimation of equation (6), where the treatment eect,
jst is stratied by educational attainment. The second specication presents estimation
results of equation (9), which measures the treatment eect on those without a high school
degree. The third specication is also based on equation (6), but constrains the treatment
eect among those with more education than a high school degree to be zero and straties
the eect on high school drop{outs by gender. Finally, the fourth specication is analogous
to the second specication, but also straties the treatment eect by gender.
30If there is specication error in equation (7), as well as sampling error in the cell means, computation
of the correct variance of  is more complicated and requires additional assumptions about the correlation
between the sampling error and the specication error, as well as the correlation in the sampling errors of
dierent cells. When equation (7) is estimated on the individual{level data, rather than the cell means, boot-
strapped standard errors are very close to those computed with equation (14), which suggests specication
error is not a problem. Those estimates are available upon request.
22The models in Table (5) use the overall unemployment rate among all men as a control for
business cycle eects, while the estimates in Table (6) are conditional on the unemployment
rate among college educated men. The results in Table (7) present estimates from the
nonlinear least squares models, where jst is specied by equations (10) and (11). Finally,
the models estimated using only residents of large MSA's are reported in Table (8). In these
the model is conditional on the unemployment rate of all men in the state, and are thus
comparable to the results in Table (5). Below each parameter estimate is the standard error
given by the weighted least squares or nonlinear least squares procedure. Below this is the
corrected standard error based on equation (14).
Since about half of the GA recipients in Michigan had a high school degree, the estimated
increase in employment and labor market participation among high school drop{outs does
not estimate the the total increase in these outcomes due to the elimination of the GA
program. However, since it is likely that nearly all former GA recipients will enter the very
low{skilled end of the labor market, the eects of their increased participation will be more
accurately measured by changes in the hours of work and earnings of high school drop{outs
in Michigan.
In Table (5), employment among high school drop{outs is estimated to have increased by
0.9 percentage points. There was virtually no change in employment among better educated
groups in Michigan, which indicates the model is not picking up alternative inﬂuences on
the Michigan labor market. Specications three and four indicate that all of the increased
employmentwas by low educated women. In Table (6), the estimated increase in employment
among people of all levels of education is larger when the unemployment rate for college
educated men is used as the control for labor demand, which is to be expected since changes
in the demand for better skilled people does not perfectly track changes in overall labor
demand. The estimated increase among people without a high school degree jumps to 2.6
percentage points. However, if the 1.4 percentage point increase among people with a high
school degree is taken as a measure of the labor market shock experienced by everyone in
Michigan after October, 1991, the eect of GA reform on the employment of high school
drop{outs is only 1.2 percentage points, which is close to the 0.9 percentage point increase
from Table (5). Interestingly, the nonlinear models presented in Table (6) show the largest
23eect: the estimated increase in employment among high school drop{outs is estimated to
have increased by 2.4 percentage points, and no change among better educated groups. As
found in Tables (5) and (6), women experienced larger employment gains than men.
The estimates in all three tables indicate that these increases in employment are driven
largely by increased labor force participation, though most of the parameters are estimated
quite imprecisely. Like the employment estimates, the estimated increases in labor force
participation in specication (1) are larger when the unemployment rate among college
educated males is used, though when high school drop{outs are compared relative to people
with a high school degree, the estimates from Tables (5) and (6) are smaller. In the rst
table, the estimated increase among high school drop{outs falls from 0.8 percentage points
to 0.2 percentage points, while in Table (6) the point estimate falls from two percentage
points to 0.8 percentage points. The results in both tables indicate that all of the increase
was among low{educated women.
The changes in employment and participation in Detroit (Table (8)) are larger than
those for the state as a whole.31 The increase in employment among people without a high
school degree was 3.4 percentage points, though labor force participation increased by only
1.4 percentage points. Again these eects are smaller when very low educated people are
compared to those with just a high school degree in their state. An important dierence,
though, between the changes in Detroit and those in the state as a whole is that in Detroit
large employment gains were also made by men, not only women. The increase in very low{
educated male employment in Detroit was 4.2 percentage points higher than in the control
cities (or 2.3 percentage points when measured relative to changes among people with a
high school degree). This employment increase among men was largely out of the pool of
unemployed workers, as their labor force participation rate was unchanged.
The estimated change in hours of work among workers is largely consistent across all
four tables of results, and indicate that hours of work fell among the least educated group,
particular among men. When the estimates condition on the overall male unemployment
31Since the overall state unemployment rate is used as the control for labor demand in this model, the
larger eect may simply be due to diering labor market conditions in Detroit. This possibility has not been
investigated yet.
24rate (Table (5)), the point estimate is that hours among high school drop{outs fell by 1.4
hours per week (or 4% of their average of 33 hours per week). Hours among high school
graduates also decreased, however, and thus the relative decline in hours among the least
educated in Michigan was only 0.9 hours per week (or 2.7%). In Tables (6) and (7) the
decrease in hours worked among workers is slightly smaller, 0.4 hours per week. This decline
in hours occurred only for low{educated men, whose average hours declined by one to one
and a half hours per week.
In contrast to changes in hours of work among workers alone, changes in hours of work
among both workers and nonworkers increased, particularly among female high school drop{
outs. The two percentage point increase in employment among women in Michigan found in
specication (3), Table (5), corresponds to 1.2 additional hours per week, which is an eleven
percent increase from the average of eleven hours per week in this group.32 Since hours per
week changed among better educated workers, however, the eect estimated in specications
(2) and (4) are more appropriate estimates of the eect of welfare reform. Low{educated
women's hours increased by only 0.6 hours per week relative to better educated women in
Michigan. These estimates are similar when the unemployment rate for college educated
men is used to measure business cycle eects. However, the eects are considerably larger
in Table (7), when the labor market shocks are treated as unobservable. In that model,
increases in overall hours of work among better educated workers are small, 0.5 hours per
week for those with only a high school degree, and the increase by low{educated women
relative to women with a high school degree (specication (4)) is 1.9 hours per week (or 17%
of the average of eleven hours per week). The changes in hours of work in Detroit followed
the same pattern as changes among low{educated workers statewide, though the estimated
magnitude is smaller.
What emerges from this evidence of changes in labor market participation, employment,
and hours of work is that, statewide, women without a high school degree entered the labor
market and found work. The magnitude of this increase is between 1.4 and 2.8 percentage
points. Increases in employment among men occurred primarily in the Detroit area. As
32Since overall hours per week increased among better educated workers (see specication (1)), the restric-
tions in specication (3) are not valid.
25argued above, the measured increase in employment among the least educated people may
understate the overall increase in employment that resulted from the elimination of the GA
program, and changes in the hours of work may be a more appropriate barometer of the
eects on the lowest skilled people. Overall hours of work among female high school drop{
outs increased signicantly, most likely due to the employment increases among that group.
While most of the models did not nd changes in total hours of work among all male high
school drop{outs, hours of work among working men in this group declined by between 0.9
and 1.9 hours per week. This could be due to full{time men dropping out of the labor market
and being replaced by women and part{time men.
There were about the same number of women as men on GA in Michigan, though the
results indicate that only women increased their labor market participation statewide. One
explanation for this is that women on GA were, on average, more employable than the men.
Support for this comes from a nding by Bound, Kossoudji and Ricart-Moes (1998) that
following the elimination of the GA program, SSI applications among men increased signi-
cantly more than those among women indicates that men may have been disproportionately
more likely to be disabled. Another explanation for the dierent nding for men and women
is that, although GA recipientslivedin Detroit in about the same proportion as the statewide
population, the labor market eects by men may have been more pronounced in that city if
the availability of low{skilled jobs better suited to men were more concentrated in the city.
Finally, displaced men could have chosen to exit the labor market, with the net result of
no net increase in employment or labor market participation. On{going work attempts to
address these issues.
Since logs of earnings are used as the dependent variables in equation (6), the coecient
estimates in Tables (5) through (8) represent percent changes in hourly and weekly earnings.
Statewide, hourly wages among high school drop{outs as a whole did not change. However,
the point estimates indicate that hourly earnings rose among the least educated men and fell
among women. Conditional on the unemployment rate for all men (Table (5)), relative to
the earnings of men with only a high school degree, hourly earnings among men without a
high school degree rose by 3.8 percent, and fell by 6.2 percent among women. The numbers
are similar in Tables (5) and (6), although in all cases the standard errors are quite large.
26Table (8) provides evidence that relative to the other control cities, hourly wages among
low{educated men in Detroit fell by about four percent.
Weekly earnings among the lowest educated in Michigan fell for both men and women.
In Table (5), among all high school drop{outs, weekly earnings fell by 7.1 percent relative to
low{educated people in the control states. They fell by only 5.3 percent relativeto the decline
among people with a high school degree. These estimates are smaller when conditioned on
the unemployment rate among college educated males. In Table (6), the point estimate
indicates weekly wages fell by only 1.6 percent relative to the change in wages among people
with a high school degree. This coecient goes to zero in Table (7). When stratied by
gender, the fall in weekly earnings reported in Tables (5), (6), and (7) are larger for men,
which is expected given their large decline in hours worked per week. Finally, in Detroit,
weeklyearnings declined by 10.6 percent among high school drop{outs, relativeto the decline
among people with a high school degree. This was accounted for by a thirteen percent drop
among men and a 6.4 percent drop among women. These large eects are driven by declines
in hours per week as well as large declines in hourly earnings among both sexes.
To put these results into perspective, if half of the former GA recipients entered the labor
market, it would represent eight percent of the size of the population without a high school
degree. The corresponding decline in hours among this group is at most 0.9 hours per week
(Table (5), specication (2)), or 2.7 percent, with no evidence of declines in hourly earnings
statewide. If a disproportionate increase in labor market participation occurred by former
GA recipients in Detroit, then the results in Table (8) indicate declines in hourly earnings of
up to ve percent may be attributable to the labor market eects of the elimination of the
GA program. Whether the dierent results for the Detroit area and the state as a whole are
driven by dierences in the availability of low{skilled jobs needs to be investigated further.
Two caveats are important note in interpreting these results: rst, as former GA recip-
ients enter the labor market, there will be compositional changes in the labor force which
will aect average outcomes. For example, if new entrants to the labor market tend to work
fewer hours than existing workers, the estimated average hours among workers will fall even
if hours of work among existing workers do not change. Similarly, if new entrants tend to
earn less on average than existing workers, measured average earnings will fall even if there
27is no downward wage pressure on existing workers. It is dicult to separate these composi-
tional changes from the true labor market eects of increased labor market participation by
former GA recipients.
Second, there may have been shocks to the labor market for low{skilled groups in Michi-
gan that were not accounted for in the model, in particular, shocks that did not aect groups
with the same intensity over time. One possibility yet to be investigated is whether there
was a decline in AFDC caseloads in Michigan, beyond what could be explained by changes
in the unemployment rate. Another possibility is that increased labor market participation
among former GA recipients led to increased net emigration from the state. This would work
to reduce the size of the supply shock to the low{skilled labor market.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Welfare reform has been claimed as one of the great political achievements of the 1990's.
Recipients are required to work, and are limited to two consecutive years or ve years in the
lifetime of benet receipt. State governments must meet strict targets for moving welfare
recipients into the workforce, and were given increased ﬂexibility in the design of programs.
The criteria for evaluating such a large change in policy must include the degree to which
self{suciency has been promoted among the at{risk welfare population, the decline or
advancement in material health and well{being among that population, as well as the \tran-
sition" costs of the reform. In particular, it is important to understand how increased labor
force participation among former recipients will impact the labor market for very low{skilled
workers.
This study takes a rst step in that direction by evaluating how local labor markets in
Michigan were aected when General Assistance, a sizable program for low{income people
who do not qualify for federal assistance, was eliminated in 1991. The results suggest that
increased labor force participation among former GA recipients led to small gains in overall
employment, though larger gains in the Detroit area, and moderate declines in the hours
of work among the working. Among people without a high school degree, employment in
Michigan overall increase by between one and two and a half percentage points, relative to
28changes in the employment of people with a high school degree. Most of the employment
gains were by women. Among working people without a high school degree, hours at work
fell by about 1.2 to 2.4 hours per week, with larger declines among men. Weekly earnings
declined by as much as ve percent, principally due to the fall in hours per week, rather
than through a fall in earnings per hour.
There are two important considerations for transferring these results into lessons for
AFDC reform: What is the likely labor supply response among single mothers with children,
the group most aected by the reform of the federal welfare system? Are the elasticities of
labor demand for such people likely to be dierent than that for GA recipients in Michigan?
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31A Appendix
This appendix details the model outlined in Section (4). Let p be the price of the locally
produced good, and xi(p;wi) an individual's demand for it. y is the level of total production








where the rst summation is over the N workers and the second is over the dN welfare
recipients. E represents net demand from outside the locality and is assumed to be perfectly
inelastic.
Equilibrium in the labor market requires the equality of the demand and supply of un-
skilled and skilled labor:





y  c2(wu;w s;r)=
N X
i=1
i  Li(wi;p) (17)
The model is solved by dierentiating the equilibrium conditions given by equations (15),
(16), and (17), as well as the condition that price equals the marginal cost of production.



















where γp and γw represent the price and income elasticities of demand, and s = xs PN+dN
k=1 xk
is the share of total output bought by the individual. Thus changes in aggregate demand
arise from three sources: the change in prices, the change workers' income, and the change
in welfare recipients' income.
















Let l be the share of total costs, C = y  c, paid to labor of type l (l = u;s), l =
wlLl
C .
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where s = sLs P
i iLi.T h a ti s ,s is the ratio of the skilled{labor supplied by person s,t ot h e
pre{reform stock of skilled labor. Thus equation (20) says that the percent change in the
stock of skilled labor is equal to the percent change in labor supply by workers, weighted
by their share of the stock of skilled labor prior to the reform, plus the percent increase in




















Similarly, the total derivative of equation (16), the equilibrium condition in the market





















i Li is the ratio of the supply of unskilled labor by individual s to the stock of
unskilled labor prior to the reform.










where again l be the share of costs paid to type l.







where w and p are the elasticities of labor supply with respect to the wage and the price











Equations (18) and (21), along with the equations for the change in the price of output,
wages, and labor supply, can be combined to obtain the equation (24), which relates changes
in the skilled and unskilled wage rates to the increase in skilled labor the former welfare




















































where lm = lmm + γpm is the Marshall{Hicks uncompensated demand elasticity.




















































The relations in equations (1) through (4) follow from solving equations (24) and (25) for
the changes in skilled and unskilled wages. The terms su, ss, uu,a n dus in equations (3)
and (4) are equal to the four terms in square brackets in equations (24) and (25) respectively.















34Table 1: Characteristics of Public Assistance Recipients, 1979{1996
1979-1988 1989{1991 1992-1993 1994{1996
Control Michigan Control Michigan Control Michigan Control Michigan
CPS sample size 2658 477 890 154 609 42 820 37
Annual population estimate 454026 82328 447195 81269 501058 36454 549708 24666
(9705) (3921) (16122) (6738) (22270) (7528) (21143) (4365)
Woman 57.6 40.7 62.6 50.3 64.3 55.5 68.8 68.2
Nonwhite 44.5 47.2 48.5 44.8 44.8 51.5 51.9 40.4
Married 24.6 21.2 21.8 15.8 21.1 15.8 19.5 33.6
No HS degree 51.1 43.1 45.8 48.1 39.8 32 40.2 29
HS degree 37.8 42.4 38.8 32.4 41.1 30.9 38.1 27.7
College degree 11.2 14.5 15.4 19.5 19.1 37.1 21.7 43.3
MSA resident 66.5 65.9 80.9 82 78.8 72.2 82.1 97.8
Large MSA resident 42.9 57.7 48 47.9 45.3 32.8 47.6 51.2
Age 33.4 33.5 33.9 35 35.2 37.1 34 36.4
Employed 20.7 18.8 19.7 23.6 22.2 30.2 24.9 34.7
Unemployed 47.1 67.1 42.8 53 39.9 12.2 32.9 10.2
Not in labor force 60.8 43 65.6 49.9 63 65.6 62.9 61.4
Weekly earnings
Among workers 258.4 277.6 230.57 191.32 245.52 252.05 402.4 243.22
Among all people 84.15 100.75 72.45 69.4 78.37 144.84 155.69 87.4
Public Assistance 1.1 1.6 1 1.6 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.3
AFDC 2.8 4.6 2.7 4.4 3 4 2.2 3
Source: Author's tabulation of March Current Population Survey.
Note: Top panel are means among people reporting income from non-AFDC public assistance. Bottom panel are means
among all persons. Standard errors for annual population estimates are given in parentheses. Observations are weighted by
the March Supplement weights. Large MSA's include Boston, Nassau-Suolk counties, New York City, Newark, Pittsburgh,
Philadelphia, and Detroit.
3
5Table 2: Characteristics of Public Assistance Recipients and the Overall Population, 1989{
1991
Michigan Control States
Public Assistance Overall Public Asstance Overall
Women 50.3% 50.0% 62.6% 51.2%
Nonwhite 44.8 15.6 48.5 16.0
Married 15.8 51.6 21.8 53.7
No HS degree 48.1 18.6 45.8 18.0
HS degree 32.4 38.6 38.8 39.6
College 19.4 42.8 15.3 42.4
MSA resident 82.0 83.1 80.9 76.9
Large MSA resident 47.9 50.1 48.0 29.1
Employed 23.6 70.0 19.7 72.9
Unemployed 53.0 10.2 42.8 7.3
Not in labor force 49.9 22.1 65.6 21.4
Average weekly wage
Among workers $191.32 $548.98 $230.57 $556.45
Among all people 69.40 426.88 72.45 437.26
Age 35.0 33.7 33.9 33.9
CPS sample size 154 10,397 890 78,444
Annual population estimate 81,269 5,143,867 447,195 43,887,789
Source: Author's tabulation of March Current Population Survey. Observations are weighted
using March Supplement weights. Large MSA's include Boston, Nassau{Suolk counties,
New York City, Newark, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Detroit. Public Assistance refers to
any cash assistance program other than AFDC.
36Table 3: Simulations of Labor Market Eects on High School Drop{outs In Michigan
su = −0:75 su = −0:25 su =0 su =0 :25 su =0 :75
(su = −0:32) (su = −0:19) (su = −0:13) (su = −0:06) (su =0 :06)
Elasticity of labor supply (w)=0 . 4
uu = −15 Hourly earnings -0.09% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.09%
(uu = −4:01) Hours per week -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04
uu = −5 Hourly earnings -0.30 -0.28 -0.27 -0.26 -0.25
(uu = −1:42) Hours per week -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10
uu = −1 Hourly earnings -2.27 -1.23 -1.03 -0.91 -0.83
(uu = −0:39) Hours per week -0.91 -0.49 -0.41 -0.36 -0.33
Elasticity of labor supply (w)=0
uu = −15 Hourly earnings -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
(uu = −4:01) Hours per week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
uu = −5 Hourly earnings -0.33 -0.31 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29
(uu = −1:42) Hours per week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
uu = −1 Hourly earnings -4.91 -1.96 -1.74 -1.93 1.55
(uu = −0:39) Hours per week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3
7Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Sample
Variable Pre{Reform Post{reform
Michigan Control states Michigan Control states
Age 33.2 33.3 33.7 33.8
(10.5) (10.5) (10.5) (10.5)
Woman 0.515 0.526 0.515 0.527
Nonwhite 0.169 0.145 0.169 0.151
Nonwhite woman 0.092 0.079 0.093 0.083
Married 0.518 0.529 0.510 0.523
Central city 0.216 0.270 0.209 0.266
No HS degree 0.185 0.183 0.163 0.169
HS degree only 0.416 0.411 0.350 0.373
Some college 0.231 0.198 0.307 0.245
College degree 0.101 0.128 0.119 0.144
More than college 0.067 0.080 0.061 0.069
College educ. male 2.16% 2.60% 2.61% 3.53%
unemployment rate (0.58) (1.07) (0.44) (1.31)
Employed 0.711 0.733 0.721 0.721
Unemployed 0.078 0.056 0.080 0.071
Not in Labor force 0.229 0.223 0.217 0.224
Hours per week
Among workers 38.7 39.0 38.63 38.74
(13.3) (12.5) (13.50) (12.7)
Among all people 26.0 27.1 26.49 26.6
(21.2) (20.8) (21.1) (20.8)
Avg. weekly earnings $512.57 $513.39 $511.77 $508.63
(366.00) (359.31) (367.44) (357.72)
Avg. hourly earnings $13.54 $13.41 $13.24 $13.50
(16.81) (13.58) (11.00) (18.23)
Sample size 106,435 750,299 85,802 616,498
Source: Author's tabulation of Current Population Survey. Standard errors in parentheses.
38Table 5: Regression Estimates Using Unemployment Rate For All Men
Specication Employment Hours of work Laborforce Weekly earnings Hourly earnings
among workers among all participation
(1) Less than high school 0.009 -1.364 0.408 0.008 -0.071 -0.006
WLS S.E. (0.017) (0.782) (1.150) (0.016) (0.059) (0.043)
Adjusted S.E. [0.011] [0.354] [0.396] [0.011] [0.036] [0.029]
High school -0.000 -0.472 0.454 0.006 -0.018 0.001
WLS S.E. (0.012) (0.425) (0.777) (0.011) (0.032) (0.024)
Adjusted S.E. [0.006] [0.192] [0.273] [0.006] [0.013] [0.011]
Some College -0.003 0.144 1.188 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009
WLS S.E. (0.011) (0.374) (0.720) (0.010) (0.028) (0.021)
Adjusted S.E. [0.005] [0.163] [0.251] [0.005] [0.014] [0.011]
Adjusted R2 0.937 0.919 0.917 0.941 0.944 0.943
(2) Less than high school
relative to high school 0.009 -0.892 -0.045 0.002 -0.053 -0.007
WLS S.E. (0.022) (0.789) (1.232) (0.020) (0.059) (0.042)
Adjusted S.E. [0.013] [0.378] [0.468] [0.012] [0.038] [0.031]
Adjusted R2 0.935 0.911 0.924 0.943 0.934 0.928
(3) Less than high school by gender
Men -0.001 -1.924 -0.421 -0.007 -0.089 0.022
WLS S.E. (0.015) (0.641) (0.951) (0.015) (0.055) (0.047)
Adjusted S.E. [0.014] [0.422] [0.505] [0.015] [0.042] [0.036]
Women 0.020 -0.451 1.216 0.025 -0.038 -0.042
WLS S.E. (0.015) (0.768) (0.956) (0.015) (0.066) (0.056)
Adjusted S.E. [0.016] [0.597] [0.534] [0.016] [0.052] [0.038]
Adjusted R2 0.978 0.968 0.971 0.976 0.971 0.960
(4) Less than high school relative to high school, by gender
Men 0.001 -1.465 -0.571 -0.012 -0.053 0.038
WLS S.E. (0.018) (0.680) (0.889) (0.018) (0.054) (0.045)
Adjusted S.E. [0.016] [0.464] [0.657] [0.016] [0.044] [0.039]
Women 0.019 0.043 0.636 0.019 -0.038 -0.062
WLS S.E. (0.017) (0.788) (0.864) (0.017) (0.063) (0.053)
Adjusted S.E. [0.018] [0.635] [0.648] [0.018] [0.055] [0.040]
Adjusted R2 0.978 0.962 0.981 0.979 0.968 0.953
Note: Sample size equals 720 in specications (1) and (3), and 480 in specications (2) and (4).
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9Table 6: Regression Estimates Using Unemployment Rate of College Educated Men
Specication Employment Hours of work Laborforce Weekly earnings Hourly earnings
among workers among all participation
(1) Less than high school 0.026 -0.624 0.738 0.020 -0.034 -0.009
WLS S.E. (0.020) (0.942) (1.310) (0.019) (0.073) (0.051)
Adjusted S.E. [0.011] [0.345] [0.393] [0.011] [0.034] [0.028]
High school 0.014 -0.202 0.375 0.012 -0.018 -0.007
WLS S.E. (0.014) (0.523) (0.897) (0.013) (0.040) (0.028)
Adjusted S.E. [0.006] [0.193] [0.270] [0.006] [0.015] [0.012]
Some College 0.008 0.299 0.679 0.002 0.003 -0.012
WLS S.E. (0.013) (0.463) (0.833) (0.012) (0.036) (0.025)
Adjusted S.E. [0.006] [0.182] [0.270] [0.006] [0.015] [0.013]
Adjusted R2 0.923 0.888 0.899 0.926 0.917 0.925
(2) Less than high school
relative to high school 0.012 -0.419 0.362 0.008 -0.016 -0.002
WLS S.E. (0.024) (0.933) (1.364) (0.023) (0.071) (0.049)
Adjusted S.E. [0.012] [0.371] [0.449] [0.011] [0.035] [0.030]
Adjusted R2 0.922 0.878 0.910 0.930 0.907 0.905
(3) Less than high school by gender
Men 0.024 -1.236 0.234 0.010 -0.059 0.015
WLS S.E. (0.019) (0.782) (1.142) (0.017) (0.069) (0.054)
Adjusted S.E. [0.014] [0.420] [0.500] [0.014] [0.037] [0.032]
Women 0.026 0.286 1.142 0.029 0.009 -0.036
WLS S.E. (0.019) (0.933) (1.146) (0.017) (0.082) (0.064)
Adjusted S.E. [0.015] [0.581] [0.523] [0.015] [0.054] [0.043]
Adjusted R2 0.965 0.954 0.960 0.926 0.956 0.950
(4) Less than high school relative to high school, by gender
Men 0.011 -0.989 0.097 0.002 -0.022 0.041
WLS S.E. (0.022) (0.817) (1.064) (0.019) (0.065) (0.051)
Adjusted S.E. [0.016] [0.464] [0.643] [0.015] [0.040] [0.035]
Women 0.014 0.043 0.533 0.017 0.007 -0.051
WLS S.E. (0.022) (0.944) (1.033) (0.019) (0.075) (0.059)
Adjusted S.E. [0.017] [0.616] [0.633] [0.016] [0.056] [0.046]
Adjusted R2 0.967 0.947 0.974 0.976 0.955 0.942
Note: Sample size equals 720 in specications (1) and (3), and 480 in specications (2) and (4).
4
0Table 7: Nonlinear Regression Estimates
Specication Employment Hours of work Laborforce Weekly earnings Hourly earnings
among workers among all participation
(1) Less than high school 0.024 -1.045 1.811 0.019 -0.034 0.005
Approx S.E. (0.033) (0.880) (1.404) (0.042) (0.037) (0.027)
Adjusted S.E. [0.009] [0.234] [0.336] [0.009] [0.027] [0.024]
High school 0.001 -0.149 0.505 0.007 -0.007 0.007
Approx. S.E. (0.017) (0.316) (0.709) (0.009) (0.015) (0.028)
Adjusted S.E. [0.006] [0.169] [0.290] [0.006] [0.014] [0.011]
Some College 0.005 0.201 0.424 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003
Approx. S.E. (0.013) (0.366) (1.235) (0.013) (0.016) (0.022)
Adjusted S.E. [0.006] [0.157] [0.252] [0.005] [0.013] [0.011]
Adjusted R2 0.973 0.973 0.970 0.976 0.986 0.986
(2) Less than high school
relative to high school 0.026 -0.396 1.655 0.023 -0.007 -0.006
Approx. S.E. (0.027) (0.508) (1.052) (0.040) (0.042) (0.024)
Adjusted S.E. [0.012] [0.371] [0.478] [0.012] [0.033] [0.029]
Adjusted R2 0.977 0.961 0.977 0.979 0.981 0.979
(3) Less than high school by gender
Men -0.003 -1.433 0.395 -0.011 -0.048 0.022
Approx. S.E. (0.021) (0.603) (0.850) (0.029) (0.038) (0.027)
Adjusted S.E. [0.014] [0.429] [0.556] [0.014] [0.040] [0.034]
Women 0.027 0.043 1.716 0.032 -0.036 -0.037
Approx. S.E. (0.015) (0.685) (0.915) (0.020) (0.049) (0.035)
Adjusted S.E. [0.016] [0.518] [0.531] [0.016] [0.051] [0.042]
Adjusted R2 0.979 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.989 0.988
(4) Less than high school relative to high school, by gender
Men 0.017 -1.271 0.895 0.012 -0.086 0.015
Approx. S.E. (0.031) (0.732) (1.725) (0.051) (0.078) (0.039)
Adjusted S.E. [0.016] [0.451] [0.692] [0.015] [0.040] [0.035]
Women 0.034 0.653 1.903 0.044 -0.014 -0.058
Approx. S.E. (0.023) (0.851) (1.248) (0.033) (0.117) (0.046)
Adjusted S.E. [0.016] [0.593] [0.657] [0.018] [0.053] [0.043]
Adjusted R2 0.980 0.975 0.979 0.980 0.980 0.981
Note: Sample size equals 720 in specications (1) and (3), and 480 in specications (2) and (4).
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1Table 8: Regression Estimates Using Residents of Large MSA's
Specication Employment Hours of work Laborforce Weekly earnings Hourly earnings
among workers among all participation
(1) Less than high school 0.034 -0.492 1.495 0.014 -0.086 -0.029
WLS S.E. (0.018) (0.721) (1.042) (0.017) (0.054) (0.041)
Adjusted S.E. [0.016] [0.511] [0.586] [0.016] [0.054] [0.037]
High school 0.016 -0.004 1.384 0.010 0.020 0.021
WLS S.E. (0.013) (0.408) (0.743) (0.012) (0.031) (0.023)
Adjusted S.E. [0.010] [0.268] [0.426] [0.010] [0.021] [0.017]
Some College 0.013 0.435 1.783 -0.002 0.033 0.012
WLS S.E. (0.011) (0.335) (0.650) (0.011) (0.025) (0.019)
Adjusted S.E. [0.008] [0.264] [0.394] [0.008] [0.020] [0.016]
Adjusted R2 0.929 0.904 0.912 0.935 0.934 0.932
(2) Less than high school
relative to high school 0.017 -0.489 0.107 0.004 -0.106 -0.050
WLS S.E. (0.021) (0.725) (1.087) (0.020) (0.053) (0.041)
Adjusted S.E. [0.018] [0.532] [0.641] [0.018] [0.055] [0.038]
Adjusted R2 0.928 0.881 0.919 0.937 0.915 0.899
(3) Less than high school by gender
Men 0.042 -0.786 1.290 0.003 -0.137 -0.039
WLS S.E. (0.018) (0.671) (1.006) (0.018) (0.059) (0.050)
Adjusted S.E. [0.020] [0.630] [0.797] [0.021] [0.056] [0.047]
Women 0.025 -0.060 1.546 0.025 -0.017 -0.015
WLS S.E. (0.017) (0.779) (0.969) (0.017) (0.067) (0.057)
Adjusted S.E. [0.024] [0.796] [0.762] [0.024] [0.099] [0.060]
Adjusted R2 0.963 0.952 0.960 0.966 0.956 0.942
(4) Less than high school relative to high school, by gender
Men 0.023 -0.884 -0.102 -0.006 -0.130 -0.042
WLS S.E. (0.022) (0.715) (0.959) (0.021) (0.057) (0.050)
Adjusted S.E. [0.023] [0.717] [0.968] [0.022] [0.059] [0.048]
Women 0.013 0.081 0.362 0.014 -0.064 -0.054
WLS S.E. (0.020) (0.805) (0.896) (0.020) (0.063) (0.056)
Adjusted S.E. [0.028] [0.871] [0.919] [0.027] [0.103] [0.064]
Adjusted R2 0.965 0.935 0.971 0.969 0.947 0.915
Note: Sample size equals 720 in specications (1) and (3), and 480 in specications (2) and (4).
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